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EXCLUSION OF AVIATION RISKS FROM LIFE INSURANCE
CONTRACTS
RISK selection is crucial to profitable operation of the life insurance business,
and premium rates for accepted applicants must be related to the risk insured.1
With the advent of aviation, life insurance companies sought to avoid liability
for deaths due to flight by excluding aviation hazards from policy coverage.
2
The aviation exclusion rested on the premise that aviation risks were either
too great to be covered at standard premium rates or so unpredictable that no
coverage could be granted.' And companies feared that many people might
take out large policies immediately before embarking upon an aviation career.
4
The mushrooming of aviation into a major industry r led to an increasing
1. Johnson, Life Insmranwe in the Development of Aviation, WEKLY UNDERWITER 1329
(Nov. 28, 1953). Since premiums are small in relation to the company's liability,
the conditions of liability are vital. An ideally planned and managed insurance
enterprise will receive sufficient premiums from all policy holders exposed to similar
risks to pay losses incurred by that group plus overhead expenses and reasonable
profits. If a person subject to greater risks is allowed to participate with those
exposed to lesser risks, either the latter will pay more than they should or the
insurer will lose money. See PATTERSON, EssENTIALs OF INSURANCE LAW 199 (1935).
When dealing with an extra-hazard such as aviation, the insurer may: (1) decline the
application; (2) accept the application but exclude the hazard; (3) accept the application
but limit coverage of the hazard to a fixed amount of exposure; (4) accept both application
and hazard but demand increased premiums; (5) accept the entire application at stand-
ard rates. See INSTITUTz OF LIFE INsURANcE, LIrE INsuRANcE FACT BOOK 43, 44 (1953).
2. Even before the Wright Brothers made their historic flight, in 1903, life insurance
policies had recognized the hazard of flight. As early as 1878, "engagement in aeronautic
voyages or flight was prohibited ... ." Johnson, snpra note 1, at 1329.
3. See Crowdus, Aviation Inmirance, 2 J. Am L. 176, 177 (1931).
The first rash of aviation insurance broke out toward the end of World War I and ex-
tended into the 1920's. Since adequate actuarial statistics were unavailable to guide the
insurer in selecting risks prior to 1928, acceptance of these risks violated sound under-
writing principles, note 2 supra, and could only result in disaster for companies with
small premium reserves. The first data on aviation risk experience, which became available
in 1930, showed that aviation involved greater hazards than any other means of transporta-
tion. The death rate at that time was 24.1 per 100,000,000 passenger miles--sixty times the
rate for 1952. Eastern Underwriter, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 52. The earliest exclusionary clauses
proved inadequate, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Van Fleet, 47 Colo. 400, 107 Pac. 1087
(1910), and drove companies to seek more effective provisions. For the impact of state
statutes on the enforceability of aviation exclusion clauses, consult Fischbach, Validity of
Aviation Risk Exclusion Riders-A State-by-State Study in PRoczMoNGs, 46ru ANN.
MEErING OF THE LEGAL SEcTiON OF THE AmERCAN Lin CONvENTION 102 (1953).
4. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1329.
5. In 1928, 1,451 persons were employed by the airlines, 294 as pilots or crew members
and 1,157 in other capacities. CAA, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AVIATION 29 (1945).
In 1952, the airlines employed nearly 100,000 persons in all capacities and utilized more than
$1 billion in assets. American Aviation, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 13, 18. Only 1,036 airports and
landing fields were in use in 1927, CAA, HANDBOOx, op. cit. supra at 11, while more than
6,000 were in operation in 1951. American Aviation, siepra at 12. In 1929, 173,405 pas-
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number of deaths in this excluded category.0 And, as ever more beneficiaries
ran afoul of aviation exclusions, judicial hostility toward these clauses in-
creased: courts tended increasingly to favor the policy of granting coverage
to the maximum number of persons over that of allowing insurers to protect
themselves by restrictive wording.7
Today, travel on regularly scheduled airlines is safer than transportation
by automobile,8 and is generally accepted as an ordinary incident of com-
merce and recreation. 9 But many presently outstanding as well as newly
sengers were flown 45,667,334 passenger miles, but in 1952, approximately 30,000,000 pas-
sengers flew 15,548,247,000 miles. Id. at 3.
6. The average number of deaths in civil aviation accidents for the five year period,
1933 to 1937, was 333, while the total number of deaths from this cause in 1952 was 843.
CHICAGO NATIONAL SAFari CouNCi, ACCIDENT FACts 75 (1953).
7. E.g., Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F 2d 595 (6th Cir. 1939);
Marks v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 F2d 267 (9th Cir. 193); Gits v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 32 F2d 7 (7th Cir. 1929).
8.




Kinds of Transportation Miles Deaths 100,000,000 A'erage
(000,000 excluded) Passenger .Miles Death Rate
Passenger Deaths in-
passenger autos* and taxis 860,000 21,000 2.4 2.3
buses 60,000 130 0.22 0.19
railroad passenger trains 34,660 150 0.43 0.36
scheduled air transport planes 10,950 142 1.3 1.3
All deaths** connected with
the operation of-
passenger autos & taxis 60,000 30,500 3.5 3A
buses 60,000 700 1.2 1.2
railroad passenger trains 34,660 1,445 4.2 4.3
scheduled air transport lines 10,950 170 1.6 1.5
Source: Railroad data from Interstate Commerce Commission; Airplane data from Civil
Aeronautics Board; Motor Vehicle data, approximation by National Safety Council
based on data from state traffic authorities, Bureau of Public Roads and Bus Trans-
portation (magazine). Compilation prepared by Institute of Life Insurance.
* Drivers of passenger autos are considered passengers.
** All persons-pedestrians, trespassers, and thieves, as well as passengers-killed in the
operation of the vehicles are included.
9. General aviation aircraft are used for business purpose§, for flight instruction,
pleasure and sport, advertising, power and pipeline patrol, and a variety of agricultural uses,
such as dusting, spraying, fertilizing and seeding. CAA, STATs TicAL HA-mzIoI  oF Civu.
AVIATION 34-8 (1953). Domestic airline passenger travel has grown to the point where it
exceeds Pullman train travel by three billion passenger miles, and constitutes 57.3c of
the combined total for both types. Id. at 59. And domestic scheduled airline carriers alone
flew nearly 250 million air cargo ton miles in 1952. Id. at 65.
1954]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
issued life insurance policies contain aviation exclusion clauses 10 or command
stepped-up premium rates." Compulsory military service, together with the
expansion of the Air Force, may render thousands of policies potentially
worthless 12 as well as make it difficult for applicants of draft age to obtain
coverage.
While all persons who flew were at first held to be within the purview of
aviation clauses, courts soon began to make distinctions.13 The decisions fol-
lowed dual paths-one for pilots and crew members, another for passengers.
Currently, further distinctions are drawn between passenger flight in a
private plane and on a regularly scheduled commercial airliner. A reappraisal
of past rulings in light of current aviation statistics is necessary to guide a




Regardless of possible defenses based on the policy's wording,14 courts have,
with rare exceptions, held that beneficiaries of a pilot or of crew members
10. Three types of exclusions in general use circa 1936 were: (1) "Death as a result
of service, travel, or flight, in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is
a risk not assumed under this policy." (2) "Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of
service, travel, or flight in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger on a
licensed aircraft piloted by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air service
regularly offered between specified airports, is a risk not assumed under this policy." (3)
"Death as a result, directly or indirectly, of service, travel, or flight in any species of
aircraft is a risk not assumed under this policy." See Glass, Aeronautic Risk Exchsions in
Life Insuraiwe Contracts, 7 J. AIR L. 560, 585 (1936). "Death as a result of service, travel,
or flight in any kind of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger on an aircraft operated
by an air carrier licensed and under governmental supervision, is a risk not assumed under
this policy." is a clause added to policies issued circa 1947 by the Life Insurance Depart-
ment of the Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn, New York. For the extent to which exclu-
sions of this type are still in use see INSTITUTE oF LIFE INSU.ANcE, LIFE INsURANcz FAcr
BooK 29 (1950).
11. Ibid. The overall selection of risk practices includes limitations such as the maximum
hours of flight covered and maximum policy value, and outright rejections along with ex-
clusions.or increased rates. For a recent study of the practices of 100 insurance companies
regarding applicants who contemplate travel, see ibid.
12. See, e.g., Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 580, 61 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup.
Ct 1946) (recovery denied where applicant did not intend to fly but was later killed in Air
Force plane crash).
13. See, e.g., Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F.2d 7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 564 (1929). See also discussion at page 700 tilfra.
14. See clauses in note 10 supra. The more typical clauses in very early use stated that
"persons engaged in the following classes of business or employment shall not be admitted:
... balloonists, aviators, aeronauts, aeroplanists . . ." Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the
World v. Compton, 140 Ark. 313, 215 S.W. 672 (1919) ; or "... no accidental death benefits
shall be payable if the death ... resulted from ... having been engaged in aviation ....
Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., 142 Misc. 94, 253 N.Y. Supp. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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are barred from recovery by aviation clauses. 1r The rationale of these cases
is uncomplicated: The parties have signed a contract which both are presumed
to have understood; this contract indicates an intent to exclude from coverage
any and all pilot or crew member deaths due to flight, and the court vill honor
the intention.16 However, the Second Circuit's 1951 decision in Broidy Z,.
State Mutual Lffe Assur. Co.17 sheds doubt upon the continued uniformity
of this rule. The insured, an Air Force officer, was killed while flying in the
Indianapolis Air Races. His application form had given no hint of an aviation
exclusion. But the policy issued by the company excluded the risk of flight.
This policy was accepted and paid for by the insured without actual knowledge
of the restriction."" Recovery was allowed to avoid "the absurdity that an
air force officer should take out insurance of so little value as this would other-
wise have been to him."' 9
Since this "absurdity" can arise any time a pilot applies for insurance, the
Broidy case probably requires actual notice to professional fliers where policies
are conditioned by a flight risk clause.2 0 Moreover, the implications of the
15. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 166 F2d 492 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied. 334 U.S. 846 (1948) ; Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 83 F2d 147 (loth
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 548 (1935); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 18-
Ark. 907, 69 S.W.2d 1081 (1934); Beveridge v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 120
,V. Va. 256, 197 S.E. 721 (1938). Contra: Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 470,
232 NAV. 848 (1930). Later cases have indicated that this minority holding is probably
not good law. E.g., Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 332 (ED. Mich. 1933);
Blonski v. Bankers Life Co., 209 Wis. 5, 243 N.W. 410 (1932).
The term cre;, as used in an aviation accident policy, includes those who assist in the
handling of airplanes on the ground as well as those who assist in their operation
during flight and may apply to a single person. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Rhodenbaugh,
160 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1947) (stewardess considered a crewmember though no passengers
aboard). See also Miner v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 241 Iowa 530, 41 NXAV2d
557 (1950) ; State ex rel. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo. 276, 126 S.W2d 181
(1939), quashing opinion in Hansen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 118 S.W2d
505 (1938).
16. The courts characterized pilot and crew members as having peculiar and special
skills, which were utilized with such frequency as to approximate an occupation. It
followed that they were engaged in aviation or aeronautics and came within the purview
of such exclusionary language. This w-as also true where parlicipatfing in aviation or
aeronautics was the excluded conduct as both terms coalesced when applied to a pilot
or crew member. Mass. Protective Assoc. v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1939);
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S.V2d 1031 (1934); Masonic
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N.E. 628 (1929).
17. 186 F2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951).
18. Id. at 493.
19. Ibid. The court substantiated its ruling by noting that under New York law the
mere omission to read or know the contents of a written instrument does not bar relief
by way of reformation thereof on account of mistake or fraud. As to the element of
notice so heavily stressed, see N.Y. I-zsuar%.c LAWv § 142(l) (1949): "Every policy
of life ... insurance ... delivered or issued in this state shall contain the entire contract
between the parties, and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference . .. unless
a copy thereof is endorsed upon or attached to the policy or contract wvhen issued."'
20. New York courts will strictly enforce the notice requirements of N.Y. I:Ns. LAW
§ 142(1) (1949). In Blatz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 9, 13-14, 63 N.Y.S2d
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decision may extend beyond mere rejection of the earlier assumption that the
assured knows what he is signing. Under traditional doctrines, the court
would have reached the opposite result by finding that Broidy's application
was an offer to which the company made a counter-offer containing the ex-
clusionary clause, and that Broidy's payment of the first premium was an
acceptance of the counter-offer 21 regardless of whether he, in fact, read the
policy.22 By seizing upon lack of notice to invalidate the exclusion, and thus
rejecting the view that a man is held to what he signs, the opinion may indicate
a desire to liberalize recovery in the case of pilot deaths. If this be so, courts
may increasingly examine the circumstances surrounding issuance of life insur-
ance policies to strike down exclusions of pilot deaths.
23
The rule that pilots are embraced by aviation clauses is further restricted
by the importation of proximate cause doctrines. Thus, where death was
caused by risks other than those of flight, recovery was allowed. In Bull v. Sun
Life Assur. Co.,2 4 insured was killed by enemy strafing after safely crash-
landing in the ocean. Recovery was granted on the grounds that death was a
direct result of a "risk of war," and aviation was found to be only a contribut-
ing cause.25 While some courts accept this view, 20 the majority reject it on
801, 805 (4th Dept. 1947), the policy itself- provided in its general provisions: "Entire
Contract-This instrument and the application constitute the entire contract between the
parties." A rider embodying an aviation exclusion was issued. The original copy of the
rider was signed by the insured and returned to the company; the insured's copy was
blank, and was not signed or physically attached to the policy. A rubber stamp oil the
front of the policy stated: "To be modified by an attached rider." The court ruled that
the rubber stamp was not sufficient and granted recovery. But cf. Good v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 166 Pa. Super. 334, 71 A.2d 805 (1950) (aeronautics rider need not be
physically attached to the policy in order to be valid where insured specifically accepted
rider).
21. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitler, 172 F.2d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 1949): "The
law is well settled that an application for life insurance itself is not the contract, but is a
mere offer or proposal foit a contract of insurance. It is merely a step in the creation of
the insurance contract .... And where the insurance company tenders a policy at variance
with the application, the tender constitutes a counter-offer and upon acceptance of the
policy by the insured, there is a meeting of the minds and the policy becomes the contract
between the insured and the insurance company."
22. "A contract for insurance is no different than any other contract. The insurance
company is entitled to have its contract enforced by the courts as written." Drilling v.
New York Life Ins. Co, 234 N.Y. 234, 241, 137 N.E. 314, 316 (1922). "No rational theory
of contract can be made that does not hold the assured to know the contents of the instru-
ment to which he seeks to hold the other party." Lumber Underwriters of New York v.
Rife, 237 U.S. 605, 609 (1915). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
23. Courts have used even more strained interpretations to allow recovery. See page
701 infra.
24. 141 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1944).
25. Id. at 459. No clauses excluding war risks were written into this or other mili-
tary cases discussed infra.
26. Boye v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dcuied,
335 U.S. 828 (1948) ; Riche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Go., 193 Misc. 557, 84 N.Y.S.2d 832
(Sup. Ct. 1948); Temmey v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 S.D. 387, 34 N.W.2d
833 (1948).
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the grounds that death resulted from a risk ordinarily associated with the
particular hazard: aviation 27 Thus recovery was denied in Green v. Mutual
L. I. Co.2' where the insured died of exposure and drowning after a crash-
landing on a lake.
Importation of causation rationales in this context contributes little to solu-
tion of the coverage problem. It is true that if the insured pilot or crew
member had not boarded his plane for a particular combat mission, he never
would have been fired upon. Since "the airplane brought him to where the
bullet hit him," his death can be considered the direct result of flight. How-
ever, absent the combat mission and the bullet, the flight would not have
proved fatal. In that sense, death might be considered the direct result of war.
A hopeless conflict results which serves no useful purpose in determining the
coverage of pilot and crew.2 9
The Passenger
In applying flight risk clauses to passengers, courts were from the outset
thrown into a linguistic muddle.3 With few exceptions, these early decisions
27. "To cut the chain of causation at the point of landing the aircraft on the vater
would be unreasonably to limit the purview of the phrase 'indirect result,' in a world
where the variety of fatalities stemming from flight is only too well known." Rossman
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 71 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Me. 1947) (insured drowned
after a safe emergency landing at sea). See United Commercial Travelers v. King, 161
F.2d 108 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 333 U.S. 153 (1947) (insured, freed himself from the plane, but
died from exposure); Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1942)
(insured appeared to have drowned after safe crash landing).
2& 144 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944).
29. Compare Boye v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 16S F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.), er't.
denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948) (recovery granted where insured believed lost as a result of
anti-aircraft fire), uith Thoma v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 North. 369 (Pa. 1946)
(recovery denied under almost identical circumstances). Allowing recovery on the ground
that war rather than flight led to the insured's death would seem strained except in cases
of flight under intense enemy fire. For a defense of the proximate cause theory see
Moriarity, Judicial Interpretation of Aziation Risks Exclusion Clauses 25 Norm DAmE
LAW. 695, 711 (1950).
30. Price v. Prudential Ins. Co., 93 Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817 (1929) is an example of
such preoccupation with grammatical niceties. "The phrases (from having been engaged
in aviation or submarine operations, or in military or naval service in time of war ... )
are between two semi-colons. They (aviation or submarine operations; military or naval
service) are joined uthout punctuation by the words 'or in,' and the last phrase is fol-
lowed without punctutation by the words 'in time of r'. . . . The phrases contained
different ouns. .. The use of the two words 'or in' to join the two phrases describing
materially different hazards indicates that the two phrases do not and were not intended
to express a single or continuous thought, and that the qualifying phrase 'in time of war'
was intended to refer to the next preceding phrase, 'military or naval service,' and not
also to the more remote phrase 'aviation or submarine operations." " Id. at 1045, 124 So.
at 817. In Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 470, 232 N.W. 848 (1930), the
court affirmed a recovery on the main contention that the adverbial phrase 'in time of vmr'
referred to the predicate phrase 'having been engaged in' and thus excluded all peacetime
aviation from the exception.
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made no attempt to distinguish the death of a guest in a private plane from
that of a fare-paying passenger 31 on a scheduled commercial flight. Nor
was the latter situation set apart from the death of a paying passenger on a
non-scheduled flight.32 Instead, widespread judicial haggling developed over
the proper application of such terms as "engage in," "participate in," and
"aeronautics."3 3  The original area of conflict concerned the problem of
whether a passenger "engaged in," as distinguished from "participated in,"
aeronautics.
When the words "engaged in aeronautics" were used, courts allowed re-
covery on one of two grounds. Since hundreds of people were actually em-
ployed as pilots and crew members by aviation corporations,"4 courts felt that
"engaging" suggested a continuity of action characteristic of an occupation,
rather than the single isolated act of riding in an aircraft as a paying pas-
senger.35 Consequently they reasoned that the clause evinced no intention of
the parties to exclude occasional as distinguished from occupational flight. The
alternate 'but closely related doctrine that the clause was ambiguous and
must, therefore, be construed against the insurer was advanced in Petcrs v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co.36 Since words and phrases used in insurance policies
should be construed according to their meaning in ordinary speech, hair-
splitting distinctions would neither occur to, nor be understood by, the average
applicant. He would normally assume that the policy protected him in
flights so long as he was not engaged as an airline employee.81 Since the
clause could reasonably be construed in this manner, the company was held
liable. Thus, on one rationale or another, courts held from the outset that
passengers were not excluded by "engaged in aviation" clauses. And the
later cases voice what may have been an unstated but reassuring consideration
31. E.g., First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix, 57 F.2d 731 (E.D, Ten.
1931), decision, lintited oi; appeal to passengers who take an actual part in the control
of a flight, 62 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So.
418 (1921), involved fare-paying passenger; Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n.,
29 N.M. 74, 39 P2d 1023 (1935), involved guest passengers. Recovery was denied in
each case.
32. However, when aviation clauses extended coverage to fare-paying passengers on
scheduled commercial aircraft, these distinctions became all-important. E.g., Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Halcomb, 79 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1935). See text at note 54 infra.
33. See, e.g., Swasey v. Mass. Protective Ass'n, 96 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 611 (1938); Goldsmith v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 273 (8th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 292 U.S. 650 (1934) ; Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. App. 779, 265
Pac. 400 (1928).
34. There were 1,451 personnel employed in 1928, 1,936 in 1929, 2,740 in 1930.
CAA, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AvIATIoN 29 (1945).
35. See Masonic Accid. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N.E. 628 (1929).
36. 133 Misc. 780, 233 N.Y. Supp. 500 (Supp. Ct. 1929).
37. The court in Missouri Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 908, 69 S.W.2d 1081,
1084 (1934), commented that if the average tradesman, artisan, or farmer-although he
had many times travelled by railroad and intended to do so again-were asked whether
he had engaged in railroading, he would at once answer, "No."
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in the earlier decisions-that the insured flew as a fare-paying passenger on a
scheduled commercial airliner.as
The line of cases construing the phrase "participation in aeronautics" had
a far different genesis. The early judicial view, typified by Ben' v. Travelers
Life Ins. Co.,39 was that passengers fell within this clause. The opinion relies
heavily upon dictionary definitions of both "participation" and "aeronautics" ;40
in light of these definitions the court held that an airplane passenger "partakes
of the pleasure and benefits of the art of sailing or floating in the air." He
therefore "participates" in aeronautics. Furthermore, had the intention of the
parties been merely to reject liability where the insured operated the plane,
"engaging in" language would have been used.41 This rationale was appar-
ently intended to draw a line between the general actizty of flight and the
specific action of flying the aircraft.
The "participate"-"engage" dichotomy established by the Bew rationale
was later rejected.4 In the early 1930's the principle was advanced that
aviation conditions when the policy was written, rather than judicial con-
structions of prior policies, was the key to parties' understanding of a particular
aviation exclusion. 43 Nevertheless, the opinions relied more heavily on con-
ditions at the time of the accident. From this use of current statistics it was
but a short step to the determination that while those skilled specialists who
rode in a plane and were concerned with its construction, operation or manage-
38. E.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Accid. Ass'n v. Moyer, 94 F2d 906 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 581 (1938); Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290
N.Y. 44, 47 N.E.2d 687 (1943).
39. 95 N.J.L. 533, 112 At. 859 (1921). Accord, First Nal Bank of Chattanooga v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 F.2d 731 (E.D. Tenn., 1931), decision limited on appeal
to passengers who take an actual part in the control of a flight, 62 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1933); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, S9 So. 418 (1921); Meredith v. Business-
mens Acc. Ass'n, 213 Mo. App. 683, 252 S.W. 976 (1923).
40. Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 N.J.L. 533, 535, 112 Atl. 859, 861, (1921).
41. Ibid.
42. The Bew rationale has been rejected in a long series of decisions. E.g., Chappell
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 120 W. Va. 262, 197 S.E. 723 (1938). Accord,
Mass. Protective Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F2d 595 (6th Cir. 1939); Gregory Y.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 78 F2d 522 (8th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 296 U.S. 635 (1935); Martin
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Ark. 291, 71 S.W2d 694 (1934). These decisions appear
to express the current view. See Moriarity, supra note 29, at 699-700; Glass, Aeronautic
Risk Exclusion, 7 J. Am L 305, 311 (1936).
43. In Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N._.2d 687
(1934), the court held that the meaning of the clause must be construed as of the time
the policy -.was issued. Id. at 47, 47 N.E2d at 691. It then proceeded to undermine this hold-
ing. The parties' interest was governed not by then existing decisions, but by aviation
conditions at the date of contract. Id. at 50, 47 N.E.2d at 691. Moreover, the court relied
heavily on aviation statistics as of the time of the accident. Id. at 51, 47 N.E.2d at 691.
Marks v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1938), is a still later example of
judicial reliance on the most recent aviation statistics. Thus, while pronouncing the rule
that the date of contract controls the intent of the parties, the courts appear to rely
far more heavily on advances in aviation techniques, which had become substantial and
constant.
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ment may have participated in aeronautics, one who rode solely for the pur-
pose of being transported as a passenger did not. Passengers were not, there-
fore, excluded by either "engaged in" or "participated in" language and the
meaning of the two phrases coalesced. 44
Abandonment of these semantic distinctions was a stride forward. Neither
the dichotomy between the activity of flight and the action of flying, nor that
between "engaged in" and "participated in" formed a realistic basis for assess-
ing the sweep of aviation exclusion clauses. It is doubtful whether the distinc-
tions reflected any real difference in the intent of the parties, and it is particu-
larly unlikely that the average applicant had any idea of the significance of
the two verbs. It is now clear that insurance companies must employ more
specific language to avoid liability for passenger deaths. 45
Insurers were quick to respond to the suggestion, made in Gits v. Ncw
York Life Ins. Co.,46 that addition of a phrase like "as a passenger or other-
wise" to the exclusionary clause would render it inclusive of every airplane
occupant. 47 Thereafter, most insurers incorporated this additional phrase in
their policies.48 Courts at first felt constrained to deny recovery, on the ground
that the addition of this phrase presented a statement of the insurer's intent
too clear to be overlooked or construed away.49 But this reluctance was soon
overcome by a desire in many courts to protect the applicant, apparently
combined with further recognition of the increased prevalence and safety of
commercial airline flight.
A series of decisions beginning in the late 1930's effected a volte face which
rendered the new clauses unavailing against fare-paying passengers. 0 In re-
44. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S.W.2d 1081 (1934);
Funk v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 449, 60 N.L.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Lee v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 187 Misc. 221, 46 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 267 App. Div.
985, 48 N.Y.S2d 800 (1st Dep't. 1944).
45. Cf. Faron v. Pa. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1948) (fare-paying
passenger not excluded by clause stating that double indemnity would not be paid
. . . if the death of the insured resulted directly or indirectly . . . from aeronautic ...
casualty.. . ."). See McDaniel v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 181 F2d 606
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 822 (1950) (no liability for death of Navy flier under
clause stating "as a result of travel or flight in or upon any kind of aircraft, or fron
falling or otherwise descending therefrom or therewith during said flight.")
46. 32 F.2d (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 564 (1929).
47. Id. at 10.
48. The new clauses, therefore, typically consisted of the original "engage in" or
"participate in" language with the additional clause tacked on. See Kremlick, Adjudicated
Aviatio Clauses in Life and Accident Contracts, 25 MIcH. STATE B.J. 37, 46-7 (1946).
49. E.g., Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
292 U.S. 650 (1934) (insured passenger died in plane crash) ; Mayer v. New York Life Ins,
Co., 74 F2d 118 (6th Cir. 1934) (recovery denied on similar facts); Christen v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1937) (same).
50. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 171 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1948) construed
"participating in aeronautics, as a passenger or otherwise" in favor of the insured. The
court reasoned that passengers did not participate in aeronautics and then rejected the
contention that "as a passenger or otherwise" effectively expanded the exclusion to one who
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versing their field, courts relied on the theory that the new clause was am-
biguous. Its terms, they thought, applied to activities in which a passenger
could conceivably participate or engage. Since airline passengers did not par-
ticipate or engage in aeronautics, the extension of the exclusion did not clearly
apply to them. And because the meaning of the clause to the average policy-
holder was controlling and he, upon taking a casual flight, would not consider
himself excluded, the phrase was ambiguous. Consequently it must be con-
strued against the insurer, allowing recovery.r1 This tenuous rationale-which
ignores the policy's language 2 r--was thought warranted by the injustice of
denying recovery on the basis of an isolated flight. This feeling of injustice
sprung from a belief that people cannot be expected to read and understand
insurance contracts, and therefore deserve special judicial protection.53
Yielding to judicial hostility, insurers in the late 1930's extended coverage
to fare-paying passengers on "regularly scheduled airlines. " r4 This extension
was apparently built on the fact that such passengers are protected by Govern-
mental regulations reducing the risk of flight.0  Thus, increased risks are
has no relation to the flight other than as a mere passenger. Accord, Day v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 83 F.2d 147 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 548 (1936); Sun Life Assur.
Co. v. Kiester, 83 Ga. App. 87, 62 S.E2d 660 (1950) ; Provident Trust Co. v. Equitable Life
Assur. Society, 316 Pa. 121, 172 Atl. 701 (1934) ; National Bank of Commerce v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 181 Tenn. 299, 181 S.NV2d 151 (1944). See also Moriarity, Mipra note 42,
at 702. While some of these decisions overlap in time with those giving effect to the
clause, the bulk of them fall in later years. And since 1940 or therebouts the view that
more specific language is, necessary to exclude passenger flight has become controlling.
Cf. Moriarity, supra note 29, at 702.
51. This line of reasoning was put forward in Hartol Prod. Corp. v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N.E.2d 6S7 (1943) (where a policy excluded death from having been
engaged, as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics). The court felt that
the average policy-holder would not consider himself excluded if he took an isolated
airplane flight as a fare-paying passenger. It took notice of the sixfold improvement
in the safety of air travel between issuance of the policy and the insured's death on the
theory that this improvement cast light on the insured's state of mind. Id. at 50, 51,
47 N.E. 2d at 691. Accord, Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 187 Misc. 221, 46 N.Y.S2d
241 (Sup. Ct), aff'd 2ew., 267 App. Div. 985, 48 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't 1944).
52. The use of "as a passenger or otherwise" was obviously intended to make the
insurer's meaning crystal clear.
53. See Schultz, The Special Nature of the Inmrance Contract: A Few Suggestions
for Further Study, 15 LAw & CoNxT&P. PROB. 376, 379 (1950); VANCE, HtANECoUR or
THE LAw OF INsuRAxcE 215 (2d ed. 1930), for a discussion of the finding that the
public at large, and some courts, acknowledge the prevailing business custom of even
careful businessmen not to read their policies but to rely on the accuracy, skill and good
faith of the agent. For a discussion of problems of judicial construction raised by this
attitude, see Kessler, CoWracts of Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Frecdom of Contract,
43 Co. L. REv. 629 (1943).
54. See Moriarity, mpra note 29, at 703.
55. See Socmrv OF AcruA.Rms, TRAxsAcrioxs 58 (April, 1953). Federal regulation
of aviation is carried out by two agencies, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB prescribes the Civil Air Regulations,
which deal with the competency of airmen, airworthiness of craft, and air traffic control.
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avoided and standard premium rates made applicable. And at least one conse-
quence of this retreat has gratified insurers: courts have tended to construe
the exception rigidly.56 Where no fare-paying obligation exists between the
carrier and the insured, recovery is denied.57 Similarly, if the flight was not
one regularly scheduled between definite terminals, no liability is imposed.55
Since most civilians are fare-paying passengers whenever they fly, the re-
quirement that the flight be scheduled is, for them, the crucial one." The
clause clearly extends the exclusion to flights in small non-commercial aircraft. 0
However, courts have extended it beyond this limited group, repeatedly hold-
ing that flight on commercial non-scheduled airlines which fly on a charter
rather than a timetable basis is also excluded. 61 Furthermore, where the in-
sured dies in a plane chartered from an airline operating a regularly scheduled
route, his beneficiary cannot recover. 2
Where the insured was killed in the flight of a military transport, the
beneficiary must hurdle the additional barrier imposed by the fare-paying re-
striction. Thus, in Burns v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,m the insured was killed in a
It promotes safety by certifying airmen, aircraft, and agencies such as flight and ground
schools, and checks the design, structure and performance of new planes. CAA, STA-
TISTICAL HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AVIATION 1 (1953).
56. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Halcomb, 79 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1935) (no
fare-paying obligation existed between insured and a pilot holding only a private license,
because pilot not permitted to transport persons for hire) ; Krause v. Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 844, 5 N.W2d 229 (1942) (insured who held trip pass and paid
nominal fee for ticketing expense excluded from coverage); Padgett v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 364, 173 S.E. 903 (1934) (insured, guest passenger, killed while
riding with employer who had a private license).
57. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Halcomb, 79 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Padgett
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 364, 173 S.E. 903 (1934).
58. E.g., McBride v. Prudential Ins. Co., 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d 98 (1947)
(insured contracted with company operating commercial airplanes for the use of a plane
to transport him to specified place on hunting trip). Cf. Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 318 Mass. 175, 178, 61 N.E2d 3, 4 (1945) ("A scheduled flight" on an Army tranls-
port plane was not "a scheduled passenger air service regularly offered between specified
airports.").
59. There still remains, however, the possible exception of a passenger travelling
on a regularly scheduled flight with a trip pass. See, e.g., Krause v. Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 844, 5 N.W.2d 229 (1942) (even though insured was compelled to pay
a nominal amount, under controlling regulations, to defray cost of ticketing, passenger
supplies, etc., he was held not to be a fare-paying passenger).
60. E.g., Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 166 F.2d 492 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) ; Weisman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y.S.2d 604
(Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd memo. op., 273 App. Div. 761, 75 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (1st Dep't
1947).
61. Sulzbacher v. Travelers Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Brown v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 8 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1925); No. Amer. Accident Ins. Co. v. Pitts,
213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21 (1925). Accord, Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 318
Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99 (1927); Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 213 Mo,
App. 688, 252 S.W. 976 (1923).
62. McBride v. Prudential Ins. Co., 147 Ohio 461, 72 N.E.2d 98 (1947).
63. 79 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich., 1948), aff'd, 179 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1949).
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military plane during a domestic flight between Army air bases, and recovery
was denied. The insured did not pay the regular commercial fare. In addition,
the insured was not "in the course of transportation from one definite terminal
to another," and the flight was therefore not "scheduled.'"6w But in Quinones
v. Life and Casualty Ins. Co.,65 insured, a Medical Corps doctor, was killed
under similar circumstances and recovery was allowed. The court held that
the doctor was a "fare-paying" passenger. The Army provided transportation
for which the Government paid; the fact that the deceased did not part with
his own money was thought immaterial. And the flight, reasoned the court,
was regularly scheduled by the Air Force between established airports in a
plane regularly operated by the United States. While this result may be de-
sirable, it is in conflict with the great majority of recent decisions following
Burns."6
ACTUAIAL FACTS
Since aviation exclusion clauses rest on the assumption of increased risk,
restrictions on insurer liability are valid only to the extent supported by
actuarial statistics. While rigid exclusions have declined as an insurer practice,
the use of broad excludable categories continues. Insurers' practices both as
to pilots and passengers are divided, in order of willingness to accept, by
scheduled, non-scheduled and military flight classifications.0 7 And few distinc-
tions are drawn within the last two categories between types of flight. The
validity of these distinctions, as well as the older exclusions still enforced by
64. 79 F. Supp. 847, 854 (W.D. Mich. 1948). The court also concluded that the plane
was not, at the time of the accident, "in charge of a licensed pilot," since the term
licensed pilot means one licensed by the CAA to pilot a plane carrying passengers for
hire. Accord, Richardson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 228 Iowa 319, 291 NAV.
408 (1940).
65. 209 La. 75, 24 So2d 270 (1945).
66. E.g., Greene v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944); Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co. v. Newman, 219 Ala, 311, 123 So. 93 (1929); Knouse v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co., 163 Kan. 213, 181 P.2d 310 (1947) ; Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
318 Mass. 175, 61 N.E.2d 3 (1945).
67. A recent study of the practices of one hundred insurance companies, as of 1948,
reveals the prevailing attitude of insurers. No company w-as willing to grant unrestricted
coverage to pilots of any sort. However, most companies were willing to insure pilots on
scheduled airlines subject to higher premiums and restrictions on policy amount. Non-
scheduled fliers fare worse. Fifteen to 20 companies had no practice of accepting these
pilots, and the remainder imposed more stringent restrictions than on scheduled pilots.
Military pilots faced the greatest reluctance to insure. Thirty-two companies had no prac-
tice of accepting them, while the remainder employed restrictions similar to thuse imposed
on non-scheduled pilots.
Today, 83 of the 100 companies are willing to insure applicants without any restrictions
as to flight on a regularly scheduled airline. An additional 12 companies will insure
with higher premiums. In sharp contrast, only 50 companies express a willingness to
insure flight on non-scheduled airlines, and only half of these will do so without restric-
tions. Passengers on military flights are least likely to be covered. Of the 23 companies
expressing a willingness to insure them, only 14 would do so without restrictions, while
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the courts, stands or falls on the statistics. If they fail to support these cate-
gorizations of flight risks, the system presently employed must be revamped.
Pilot and Crew Member
While the basic pilot-passenger distinction is well founded, 8 modern avia-
tion requires that underwriters make a further breakdown of the "pilot"
category. Civilian and military pilots should be divided into separate cate-
gories for insurance treatment.0 9 And further subdivision within the civilian
group is warranted by recent actuarial reports.70 Non-commercial pilots with
under 100 solo hours in the preceding year have a death rate significantly
lower than any other group.71 On the other hand, those employed as non-
airline pilots have the highest mortality. 72 Scheduled airline pilots as a group,
and persons holding commercial or transport licenses but flying only for
pleasure or on personal business, fall between the two extremes.78 Members
of the latter group with over 100 solo hours have the highest of the inter-
mediate death rates. 4
The same study shows that the lowest death rate for any group of military
13 would not insure such passengers under any conditions. INSITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE,
SUMMARY OF PRACricES OF 100 US. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES (n.d.).
For a suggestion that some increased coverage, especially regarding military pilots,
has taken place since 1948, see communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Albert
Hermalin, Ass't Statistical Dir., Inst. of Life Ins., dated March 18, 1954, in Yale Law
Library.
68. The passenger death rate per 1000 passenger hours in 1951 was .0024 while that
for the fiirst pilots was .0036. SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, TRANSACTIONS 57 (April, 1953).
69. A study of the experience of 29 companies over a five year period showed a






Scheduled Air Line Pilots 2,64
Pilots with commercial or Transport License
but employed as non-civilian pilots 6.20
Pilots with commercial or Transport License
flying for pleasure or personal business
Over 100 solo hours 3.38
Under 100 solo hours 1.05
Non-commercial with under 100 solo hours 0.79
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pilots approximates the highest civilian mortality rateYr, But the divergence
of rates among military groups was far greater than the difference between
the several civilian categories.76 With combat missions excluded, there was
an inverse ratio between pilot age and the mortality rate. Thus, the highest
death rate was found among pilots under 25 years of age.7 7 Aside from age
and experience factors,78 distinctions can be drawn according to duty assign-
ment and type of aircraft flown. Thus, jet pilots have by far the highest
death rate, followed by fliers of single and six engined aircraft. 0
75.
U.S.A.F. ox AcnvE Du-r-: AvIAT O DEATH RATE PER I000
YEARS OF EXPosun;'s
1947-51 average rate




35 and over 5A
Combat missions excluded.
f Author's condensation of data in SOCIETY OF AcrUAnms, TmA.sAc-
TioNS 58-9 (April, 1953).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. The average death rate for student pilots taking a basic training course, 1949-
1951, was 5.1 per 1,000 years of exposure, and that for the advanced course vms 14.3 per
1,000 years of exposure. Socr'ry OF AcruARmS, TRA-;sACniO;S 66 (April, 1953). These
figures, when compared to the age and death rate figures mipra note 76, may indicate
that age is a lesser factor than duty assignment. Pilots in basic training fly the safest
type of aircraft and have the lowest death rate.
79.
DEATHs iN NO N-ComBAT AncRAFr AccImErs OF A.L rA= U.S.A.F.












Not assigned primarily to flight duty 4.5
* SoCIEY OF AcruAluEs, TRANSAcnoNs 61 (April, 1953). The Society noted that
86% of the deaths in a type aircraft appropriate to the duty assignment and that a pilot
might have more than one duty assignment a year. Ibid. It is obvious from a comparison
with the 9.5 death rate for "all pilots," id. at 59, that a considerable proportion of pilots
are not assigned primarily to flying duty at any given time.
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The Passenger
The distinction as to passenger exclusion based on scheduled versus non-
scheduled flight is unsupported by the evidence.80 Different types of non-
scheduled flight require different treatment; Non-scheduled Irregular Car-
riers 81 which operate transport aircraft are very different from local charter
flying services, or pleasure or instructional flying.82 As a result of closer fed-
eral control as well as self-regulation, Domestic Irregular Carriers had by
1953 achieved an 0.7 death rate per 100 million passenger miles, which almost
matches the 0.6 rate of domestic passenger service on scheduled airlines.8 4
The probability of fatal accidents therefore remains a significant underwriting
factor only as to other categories of non-scheduled flights.
The exclusion of passengers on military flights is equally unsupported by
current statistics. As a result of high maintenance and crew training stand-
ards, the Military Air Transport Service's 0.91 death rate per 100 million pas-
senger miles for 1947-1951 compares more than favorably with the 1.5 rate
of scheduled civilian airlines.8, It is far better than the rate achieved by the
latter in transporting military passengers.88
80. Scheduled domestic passenger operations by United States Certified Air Carriers
in 1953 accounted for 30.7 million passengers and 15.4 billion passenger miles. A total
of 86 passenger fatalities occurred; the fatality rate was 0.6 per 100 million passenger
miles flown. Domestic common carriage and charter passenger services (non-military)
of the U.S. Large Irregular Air Carriers flew 481 thousand passengers and 675 million
passenger miles with only 5 passenger fatalities occurring for a fatality rate of 0.7 per
100 million passenger miles. CAB, BULLETIN 54-12 (Feb. 18, 1954). For a table indicat-
ing the gradual decline in aviation death rates since World War II, see CAB, COInPARA-
TIVE SAFErY STATIsTIcs Part II, 2 (Aug. 15, 1953).
81. The CAB delineates commercial air transport operations in two broad categories:
Certified Air Carriers (i.e., scheduled), and Large Irregular Air Carriers. See CAB
BULLETIN, note 80 supra. Large Irregular Carriers form one sub-category of the "non-
scheduled" classification used by the Society of Actuaries which includes Non-Commercial
Business (flying in large aircraft maintained by corporations for transportation of
officers and employees on company business), Commercial Miscellaneous, Personal
(pleasure), and Instructional. SOCIETv OF ACTUARIES, TRANSACTIONS 55 el seq. (April,
1953). The Irregular Carriers include all those with transport aircraft of over 12,500
pounds gross weight. Id. at 57.
82. Ibid.
83. The regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aviation Admin-
istration are collected in 14 CODE FED. REas. cc. 1-2 (rev. 1952).
84. CAB, BULLETIN, note 80 supra.
85. SoCIETY oF AcTuARiEs, TRANSACTIONS 62 (April, 1953). These figures are
based on the five year period 1947-1951. While figures for this period reflect a higher
civilian death rate than for any other postwar period, this does not affect the overall
comparison. For no 5 year postwar period have civilian fatalities fallen below the 0.9
figure for Military passenger flights. The lowest unweighted average for scheduled
civilian flights is 0.94 for 1949-53 and the 1946-53 average is 1.3. CAB, COMxPARATIVE
SAFErY STATISTICS Part II, 1. (Aug. 15, 1953); CAB, BULLETIN 54-12 (Feb. 18, 1954).
86. Military passenger operations of certified carriers for 1953 (including Civil
Air Movements) accounted for 406,000,000 passenger miles flown. There were 21 pas-
senger fatalities (one domestic accident) ; the death rate was 5.2 per 100 million
passenger miles. CAB, BULLETIN 54-12 (Feb. 18, 1954).
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Today's statistics show that indiscriminate lumping of pilots and passengers
into a few broad categories is grossly inadequate. W1rhile at one time these
categories may have reflected actual experience, their continued use does not.
Neither civilian nor military fliers can be treated as single groups; risk factors
vary widely within each group. Similarly, the actuarial facts indicate that
many distinctions drawn on the basis of fare-payment or the scheduled char-
acter of flight are unwarranted. By granting coverage to passengers on sched-
uled civilian flights, insurers have tacitly admitted that the death rate in-
volved is an insignificant underwriting factor.S7 Since the military rate is
lower than the civilian, it follows that exclusion of passengers on domestic
military flights is unjustified. For the most part, passengers on military
aircraft and those on scheduled or large irregular civilian flights bear the same
risks, and restricted coverage is necessary only with regard to passengers on
other non-scheduled craft and the military passenger services of the civilian
airlines.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Life insurance is today more important to the economic welfare of millions
of people than in any previous generation.s s Therefore, insurance companies
should revamp their policies, and courts, in construing them, should harmonize
their doctrines with changed aviation conditions.80 Restrictions, to be justifi-
able, must represent an honest appraisal of existing hazards, grounded on
sound underwriting criteria. A detailed classification on the basis of actuarial
data is essential.
These data demand substantial modification of passenger restrictions. Since
passenger risks fall into two categories, policy restrictions should do likewise.
Irregular Carrier & Military passengers should receive the same treatment
as those who fly on scheduled lines. And policies containing flight risk exclu-
sions should offer extended coverage for all types of non-scheduled flight at
87. This treatment of airline passengers by the companies is dearly warranted by
the fact that the death rate for travel in automobiles and taxis, for which there is no
exclusion, exceeds the rate for scheduled or non-scheduled air transportation. See table,
note 8 supra.
8& In 1952, 219 million policies protected 88 million holders. The average coverage
per policyholder has risen from $780 in 1902, to $3,100 in 1952. INsr. Ur LWy I::s.,
L=E INsURANcE FAcT BooK 5 (1953). Three out of every four families own life in-
surance. Id. at 7. During 1952, total benefit payments exceeded $4 billion for the first
time and were $1.7 billion greater than in 1942. Ownership is not confined solely to
higher income groups. Sixty percent of the families in the $1000 to $1999 annual income
class ovn life insurance. Id. at 13. Twenty-nine percent of the families put 5% or
more of their disposable income into life insurance premiums. Id. at 15.
89. Courts can do this-as they have in the past-by finding exclusionary clauses am-
biguous, since the insured would have been justified in assuming he vas not excluded
because statistics on the safety of air passenger flight would not support an excusicn.
See, e.g., cases cited in notes 43, 51, and accompanying text. See also Lachs v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 281 App. Div. 633, 121 N.Y.S.2d 230 (lst Dep't 1953), aff'd, \o. 221,
Ct. App., March 4, 1954.
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increased premium rates. If the applicant accepts the extended coverage the
company will be .bound. If he rejects it and subsequently dies on an excluded
flight, the insurer will incur no liability.
Moreover, blanket pilot exclusions should be scrapped and systematic sub-
categorization substituted therefor. Restrictions and rate adjustments for
civilian pilots should be determined by the type and frequency of flight, while
for military fliers classification based on pilot's age and type of craft flown
should, whenever practicable, be substituted for nondiscriminating categoriza-
tion. Some insurers are currently making these distinctions, 0 and the re-
mainder should follow suit.
By formulating their restrictions within this framework, insurers will avoid
the adverbial and prepositional monsters of the past. The insured's activity
should be listed in the policy together with a clear statement of the degree to
which coverage is restricted or rates increased. In addition, all applicants
should be given actual notice of the company's rates, limitations, and exclusions
of aviation risks, and how these rules affect them. The applicant should be
impressed with his duty to notify the insurer whenever his flight risk status
changes. Should he fail to do so and subsequently die as a result of a more
hazardous activity, the policy will be void.01 Similarly, if the insured's status
becomes less hazardous he should, upon notice to the company, became elig-
ible for a reduction in premiums. 0 2 Past litigation has indicated that by ex-
panding coverage, insurers are better able to obtain enforcement of retained
restrictions.93 And a rationalization of coverage founded upon current avia-
tion statistics will adequately protect the legitimate business interests of in-
surers while granting maximum protection to beneficiaries.
STANLEY P. WAGMANt
90. For an example of one company's recognition of the necessity of this approach
see, THE UNrrnx, presented by United Services Life Insurance Co., Washington, D.C.
The monthly allotment premium rates contain extra premium for aviation risks. Pilots
and crewmembers pay $5.00 extra with the exception of all fighter pilots, USAF Occupa-
tional Specialists, and Navy Aero. Eng. Duty Officers, who pay an extra $15, $2, $2
respectively. Id. at 7.
91. It is reasonable to place this burden on the insured in light of the increased
coverage that would be available to him at all times upon his proper performance of the
contract
92. Assuming that investigation bears out the insured's contention, the company will
fix a new premium rate. This rate shall be effective from the date of notice. But if ad-
ministrative costs for refunding any excess paid for the premium period during which
the change occurred are prohibitive, then such amount shall be credited to the insured's
favor at the next premium anniversary
93. See page 702 supra.
t Member, Class of 1954, Yale Law School.
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